Assistant Professor (Professor Auxiliar), School of Economics and Management, Portuguese Catholic University, Porto
PhD, Philosophy, University of Porto, Portugal. MSc, Government and Public Administration, Getúlio Vargas Foundation, FGV-SP, Brazil. BSc, Economics, Armando Álvares Penteado Foundation, FAAP, Brazil.my webpage UCP
Sousa, P. and Mauro, C., (2013), “The Evaluative Nature of the Folk Concepts of Weakness and Strength of Will”. Philosophical Psychology. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2013.843057
Abstract This article examines the evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will and hypothesizes that their evaluative nature is strongly connected to the folk concepts of blame and credit. We probed how people apply the concepts of weakness and strength of will to prototypical and non-prototypical scenarios. While regarding prototypical scenarios the great majority applied these concepts according to the predictions following from traditional philosophical analyses. When presented with non-prototypical scenarios, people were divided. Some, against traditional analyses, did not apply these concepts, which we explain in terms of a clash of evaluations involving different sorts of blame and credit. Others applied them according to traditional analyses, which we explain in terms of a disposition to be reflective and clearly set apart the different sorts of blame and credit involved. Still others applied them in an inverse way, seemingly bypassing the traditional components resolution and best judgment, which we explain in terms of a reinterpretation of the scenarios driven by an assumption that everyone knows deep inside that the best thing to do is to act morally. This division notwithstanding, we claim that our results are largely supportive of traditional analyses (qua analyses of folk concepts).
Keywords: Blame, Credit, Evaluative Judgments, Folk Psychology, Strength of Will, Weakness of Will
Mauro, C, Miguens, S, Cadilha, S, (2013), Conversations on Human Action and Practical Rationality. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
This volume brings together leading scholars in the study of practical rationality and human action – namely, Alfred Mele, Hugh McCann, Michael Bratman, George Ainslie, Daniel Hausman and Joshua Knobe. They were interviewed by the editors in a project based at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto structured around the questions: In your view, what are the most central (or important) problems in the philosophy of action? For some or all of the following – action, agency, agent – what do they contrast with most significantly? Which of these are liable to be rational/irrational? In what sense is the thing to do to be decided by what is rational? Are there limits of rationality? What explains action, and how? What is the role of deliberation in rationality? How is akrasia possible (if you think it is)? How do you think your own work has contributed to the field? What are your plans for future research? The outcome is of great interest, not only for philosophers, but also for economists, psychologists, political scientists and sociologists.